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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Innovation is closely linked to the development of technology.  Hence it is often 
assumed that when an innovation fails it is the technology that is at fault. While this 
may be true in many instances, there are occasions when it is not the technology that 
is at fault, rather, it is managerial and organisational aspects that cause problems and 
lead to failure. Studies have shown that individuals who take on specific roles can 
play an important part in avoiding these problems.  These roles include the 
technological gatekeeper, the product champion and the sponsor/coach. In addition to 
these roles, this paper argues that there is another, namely that of godfather. With this 
role a highly respected, senior figure within an organisation provides support that is 
critical in ensuring the project overcomes the hurdles that lie in the path of any major 
new development.  The nature of the godfather role is explored through three case 
studies. These provide examples of the role and show how it can facilitate the 
innovation process.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Why do organisations sometimes resist innovation? According to Schon (1963) it is 
because it leads to change. He pointed out that the novelty associated with innovation 
often challenges ‘accepted ways of doing things and long established skills (Schon, 
1963: p83). Frost and Egri (1991: p242) quoting Macchiavelli note that, ‘the 
innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old order’. Not only 
may working practices be affected, but the changes in technology that are typically 
part of innovation, often carry with them changes in social organisation that threaten 
established hierarchies. Hence innovation, where it takes places within organisations, 
may well have political consequences in that it brings about resistance; resistance that 
may threaten the project and even lead to it being abandoned. 
 
Resistance to change is not the only political aspect of innovation. Maidique (1980), 
quoting Schwartz (1973), showed that the reluctance of middle managers to take risks, 
leads them to favour incremental innovations rather than radical ones. Further 
evidence of this has come in recent years from the work of Christensen (1997), who 
has shown how managers in established firms tend to favour incremental innovations  
when faced with disruptive technologies. 
 
Another factor causing organisations to be resistant to innovation is the systems and 
procedures they employ, especially systems designed to provide for rational 
evaluation of new developments. In the 1960s Schon (1963: p83) noted how large 
companies employed formal screening committees, while 40 years later Howell et al. 
(2005: p660) described the same processes that they labelled ‘approvals hurdles’. 
These systems form obstacles for innovation projects. They require future benefits to 
be quantified, but for new products and services this is difficult. Hence these systems 
can have a bias against innovation, because it can rarely provide the certainty they 
require.  
 
Factors such as these give a political dimension to innovation. This, as Howell et al. 
(2005) note, makes the distribution of power and strategic actions important. The 
 2
ability of a senior manager to exert power and influence can be crucial to the success 
of an innovation. It is the role of such individuals that this study focuses upon. In 
particular it explores the way in which senior managers exercise power and influence, 
usually in a subtle and even covert manner, in order to support innovation projects. 
 
Metaphors are widely used in the social sciences, especially in marketing  (Hunt and 
Menon, 1995) and organisation studies (Cornelissen, 2002), and have been used in 
connection with other roles associated with innovation (Afuah, 2003). Consequently 
this paper sets out to show that the metaphor of ‘godfather’ provides the most apt 
portrayal of this particular role. 
 
 
2. ROLES WITHIN THE INNOVATION PROCESS 
Schon (1963) was among the first to emphasize the human dimension of innovation. 
He observed that successful innovations involved a key role. He cited some fifteen 
major innovations where individuals played a pivotal part in the development process.  
Schon (1963: p77) used the metaphor of ‘champion’ to describe their role.  Maidique 
(1980: p64) defines a product champion as,  
 
‘a member of an organisation who creates, defines and adopts an idea for a 
new technological innovation and who is willing to risk his or her position or 
prestige to make possible, the innovation’s successful implementation’.  
 
A key feature of the role is adopting the innovation, which means actively and 
enthusiastically promoting it as it progresses through the various stages of 
development (Howell et al., 2005). According to Schon (1963) promoting meant 
employing conviction, persistence and energy of the highest order (Howell et al., 
2005). However product champions are typically more than simply enthusiastic 
promoters of an innovation. Frost and Egri (1991: p265) note that product champions 
have been shown to be ‘particularly proficient’ in terms of interpersonal skills. Not 
only are they willing to work with others, they are also politically astute (Chakrabarti, 
1974) which makes them highly competent at galvanising internal support 
(Venkataraman, et al., 1992). This theme is taken up by Rogers (2003: p315) who 
describes product champions as ‘brokers and arrangers’. 
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 The need for product champions is widely recognised (Kanter, 1988; Peters and 
Waterman, 1982; Pinchot, 1985), and their contribution to successful innovation has 
been widely reported (Frost and Egri, 1991; Howell and Higgins, 1990). Two thirds of 
the firms surveyed by Duchesneau (1977) confirmed the presence of such a role, and 
the SAPPHO project of the 1970s provided systematic evidence to support the 
product champion hypothesis (Achilladelis et al., 1971). 
 
Throughout, it has been recognised that the product champion role is not a particularly 
senior one within an organisation. Rogers (2003) for instance suggests that product 
champions are typically middle managers. Nor is the product champion role usually a 
well defined position within the organisational hierarchy. Rather it is a role that 
individuals take on without the benefit of training and development. 
 
Schon’s seminal work in the 1960s acted as a catalyst (Maidique, 1980) that led in 
time to the identification of a number of other significant roles within the innovation 
process. Allen (1977), in a study of internal and external communications in R & D 
laboratories, identified certain individuals as crucial to knowledge acquisition within 
the innovation process. Having identified that staff turnover and the employment of 
external consultants could make a modest contribution to external knowledge 
acquisition, Allen (1977: p145) found that there existed, ‘a small number of key 
people to whom others frequently turned for information’. They were not part of a 
formal communications system, indeed Allen (1977: p161) stressed that much 
communication was informal. Termed ‘gatekeepers’ by Allen (1977), their role 
involved acting as, ‘a clearing house for technical information for technologists’ 
(Maidique, 1980: p62). They acquired and translated external technological 
knowledge and then disseminated it to colleagues within the organisation (Howell and 
Higgins, 1990: p318). Given the informal nature of much communication, 
gatekeepers used their extensive networks of personal communications both inside 
and outside the organisation to keep their colleagues informed.  
 
As ideas about innovation, such as Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) theory of absorptive 
capacity, have increasingly come to recognise the importance of external and internal 
knowledge acquisition to successful innovation, especially in terms of distributing 
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external information to appropriate colleagues within the organisation (Tushman and 
Nadler, 1986), so the importance of the gatekeeper role has been recognised.  
 
Roberts (1968) was among the first to identify the value of innovations having some 
form of internal sponsor. In his terms sponsorship involved senior managers taking 
‘supportive actions’ (Roberts (1968: p252) to assist more junior colleagues, 
particularly with the ‘policies and attitudes’ of large organisations which can impede 
the process of innovation. Frohman (1978), elaborated on the notion of support to 
suggest that the sponsor role involved senior managers ‘coaching’ subordinates. 
Coaching meant senior managers using their knowledge and experience to provide 
guidance and development opportunities for less experienced personnel. These types 
of activity could, according to Frohman (1978) help subordinates navigate their way 
through the bureaucracy of large organisations. Roberts and Fusfield (1981) in a study 
of R & D laboratories suggested that the senior managers who could coach 
subordinates, were likely to be older, more experienced project leaders. Roberts and 
Fusfield stressed that the assistance was likely to be provided in a subtle and 
unrecognised way. Indeed they went on to caution against coaching being too 
directive, noting that with senior managers (Roberts and Fusfield, 1981: p254), 
 
‘coaching can degenerate into idea domination, project ownership and 
direction from the top.’ 
 
A slightly different perspective on the sponsor role comes from Maidique (1981). He 
portrays the sponsor as an ‘executive champion’, an entrepreneurial role that ‘bridges 
the gap between the entrepreneur and the technological champion’ (Maidique, 1981: 
p69). This implies a senior manager working closely with a product champion, who is 
likely to be a technological specialist, in order to provide him or her with support. 
This may well mean the sponsor using his or her technical expertise and the 
organisation’s informal channels to gather information from technical staff. In this 
way a sponsor can counteract what Maidique (1981: p72) describes as the 
‘conservative bias’ of middle management, resulting in hurdles being placed in the 
path of innovations that imply change. 
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The idea of a senior manager providing sponsorship for innovations in the form of 
‘organizational protection’ is also taken up by Leiffer et al. (2000: p162). All ten of 
the organisations that they studied benefited from a senior manager providing 
innovation projects with much needed organizational protection, resources and 
encouragement.  
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
This investigation of the nature of the godfather role is based on three case studies of 
well known innovations. Given that the role involves covert, ‘behind-the-scenes’ 
activities, the use of a survey, especially one based on self-administered 
questionnaires  would be unlikely to uncover what Frost and Egri (1991: p244) 
describe as the ‘political dynamics’ that are an important part of  the innovation 
process. Similarly, as the role is played out over time, the case for a longitudinal 
rather than a cross-sectional research design points to the use of case studies instead 
of some form of survey. 
 
As the number of cases used in the study is small, the selection of innovations that 
form the basis of the study is clearly critical. The three chosen are all innovations that 
had a significant impact not just on the organisations that created them, but on the 
markets and industries in which they were located. The greater the significance of the 
innovation for the parent organisation, one might reasonably surmise the greater is the 
need for a godfather figure. 
 
Two out of the three innovations had a wider impact on society, being variously 
described as a ‘cultural icon’ (Bardsley, 2005: p5) or ‘design icon’ (Laban, 1999, 
Setright, 1999), and even finding a place in the dictionary (Thompson, 1996).  As a 
result there is a wide range of documentary material available that provides valuable 
insights into the innovation process in each instance. It includes a number of 
biographies of innovators (Bardsley, 2005; Nathan, 1999; Wood, 2005) and business 
histories (Jones, 2005; Sharratt, 2000; Whisler, 1999; Wyatt, 1980).  Biographical 
material is used in many disciplines (Roberts, 2002) to explore a variety of aspects of 
people’s lives. Although the use of biographical material is unusual in management 
research, Jones and Conway (2004) maintain that biographical research is a legitimate 
research approach in the study of innovation, and one that can provide a valuable 
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source of qualitative data. When combined with contemporary press coverage, 
biographical material permits the construction of in-depth, longitudinal case studies 
that can be analysed to identify the key attributes of the godfather role. 
 
4. THE WALKMAN 
The Sony Walkman was the world’s first portable stereo tape player. Introduced in 
July 1979, it proved to be a highly successful innovation. Not only did it sell in large 
numbers, with cumulative sales of 250 million units by 1998 (Nathan, 1999: p155), it 
transformed the audio equipment market. Its impact went beyond mere sales. The 
Sony Walkman made it possible to listen to one’s own choice of music virtually 
anywhere, including on the move. As Knight (1992) pointed out the Walkman 
changed the way we listen to music. So great has been its impact that it has become a 
‘cultural icon’ – a symbol of late 20th century society. 
 
The story of how Sony developed the Walkman has been told many times and there 
are several different versions of what happened. In Stephen Bayley’s (BBC, 1991) 
words, ‘a lot of benign myths’ surround the innovation process. However all the 
accounts highlight the involvement of Sony chairman and co-founder, Akio Morita.  
 
The origins of the Walkman lie in the late 1970s. By the end of the 1970s tape 
recorders, had evolved to the point where stereo cassette tape machines were firmly 
established in the audio equipment market. However truly portable units were rare 
and confined to monaural sound. Sony at this time was racking up losses on its 
Betamax video recording technology and its compact disc (CD) technology was not 
yet ready for the market (Nathan, 1999). Consequently in 1978 Sony chose to re-
organise its activities and the tape recorder division lost its highly profitable radio 
cassette recorder work (BBC, 1991), which was transferred to another division. This 
put the division under intense pressure to come up with something else. Quite 
literally,  ‘the pride and honour of the tape recorder division depended on them 
coming up with a new product.’ (BBC, 1991).The division’s engineers tried 
modifying one of the company’s best-selling portable monaural tape recorders, the 
Pressman (du Gray et al. , 1997), to create a stereo machine. They discarded the 
speakers and the recording mechanism so that the machine consumed less power and 
ran on smaller batteries.  This resulted in a smaller, lighter and more portable 
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machine, but it required headphones to play pre-recorded music cassettes. The need 
for headphones combined with the machine’s inability to record, led the division to 
conclude that the machine had no commercial potential (Nayak and Ketteringham, 
1993). What was the use they reasoned of a tape recorder that could not record? This 
was reinforced by the fact that headphones were associated with deafness, a taboo 
subject in Japan (Nathan, 1999). Consequently the machine remained confined to the 
laboratory where young engineers used it to play music tapes while they worked.  
 
No more would have been heard of this machine had not Masaru Ibuka, Sony’s co-
founder and honorary chairman, dropped in on the tape recorder division (Ueyama,  
1997; Nathan, 1999;  Nayak and Ketteringham, 1993). Ibuka was impressed by the 
quality of the sound. He had recently seen the prototype of a new set of lightweight 
headphones being developed by Sony’s Research Laboratory (Sanderson and 
Uzumeri, 1995). He insisted on combining the portable stereo tape player with the 
new headphones. The result was a lightweight machine ideal for listening to music on 
the move or while undertaking leisure activities. Having no executive responsibility 
Ibuka was not in a position to request the development of this hybrid product. Instead 
he called on Akio Morita, Sony’s chairman.  
 
From the start Morita was enthusiastic. He borrowed the machine for the weekend and 
took it with him when he played golf. He was convinced there was a market for the 
product among young people. At the following week’s executive committee, Morita 
gained approval for the development of the new tape player (Nathan, 1999), but his 
enthusiasm was not shared by others. As he himself said, ‘it seemed nobody liked the 
idea’ (Morita et al., 1987: p80). The engineers were sceptical. Both the engineers 
from the tape recorder division and the engineers from the Research Laboratory were, 
‘polite but non-committal’ (Nayak and Ketteringham, 1993: p98). As Nathan (1999: 
p152) in his study of Sony puts it, ‘no one believed that a player with no capacity to 
record would catch on.’ Worse still for the embattled tape recorder division, 
development of the new tape player was seen as, ‘a drain on the division’s money and 
manpower’ (Nayak and Ketteringham, 1993: p100). 
 
Approval for the development to proceed was granted in February 1979. Believing 
that the market for the new portable stereo tape player would be primarily amongst 
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the young, especially students (Morita et al., 1997), Morita was adamant that the 
product be launched to coincide with the summer vacation (Kunkel, 1999). This was 
six months away and new products typically took two years to develop. A Walkman 
team was quickly assembled drawn from a range of functions (Ueyama, 1982). Given 
the timescale it was not possible to design and develop specific components, instead 
parts like the tape transport and the stereo circuitry were taken from other Sony 
products (Nathan, 1999). The first production run was optimistically set at 60,000 
units at a time when Sony’s most popular tape recorder was selling at the rate of 
15,000 units a month (Nathan, 1999: p152). Kozo Ohsone, the head of the tape 
recorder division was so concerned that he bought parts for the projected number of 
units but planned for only half this level of production (Nayak and Ketteringham, 
1993). However the team were well aware of Morita’s faith in the product.  
 
Sony’s accountants showed a similar lack of enthusiasm for the project. This was 
particularly apparent when discussions took place to set the price. Initial estimates 
indicated a price of $249 was needed to make a profit. Cost cutting reduced this to 
$200 (Nayak and Ketteringham, 1993: p102), but Morita was unhappy, he wanted a 
lower price so that young people could afford it. Eventually the price was set at $165, 
a price that had the company’s accountants worried the device might not generate 
sufficient profit to recoup the costs of development (du Gay et al., 1997). 
 
Like the company’s engineers and accountants, when it came to the launch, the 
marketing staff too showed little enthusiasm for the Walkman. Morita (Morita et al., 
1987: p81) in his memoirs claims the marketing people, ‘said it wouldn’t sell’. Nor 
were they alone, for when advance units were sent out they were greeted with 
scepticism by retailers who did not believe that a cassette recorder without a recording 
function would sell (Kunkel, 1999). For the first three months, it looked as if Morita’s 
Sony colleagues were right, as Japanese teenagers failed to buy the product in 
anything like the numbers anticipated. But sales picked up in September. By the end 
of the month the first production run of 30,000 units had sold out (Sanderson and 
Uzumeri, 1995: p763) and Kozo Ohsone was in trouble because he hadn’t built the 
other 30,000 units as projected. By early 1980 sales were running at 30,000 units per 
month as young urban professionals thronged to buy them having decided that the 
Walkman was a ‘lifestyle’ product they had to have. As the idea took hold Sony found 
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it had a runaway success on its hands. Production could not keep pace with demand as 
the first production model of the Walkman, the TPS-L2, sold 1.5 million units in the 
first two years (Sanderson and Uzumeri, 1995: p763). Sony’s competitors took a year 
to come up with a similar product, but by then the Walkman was well established 
enabling Sony to consistently retain a 50 per cent market share by revenue.  
 
While accounts of the development of the Walkman vary over details, all highlight the 
prominent part played by Akio Morita. Just what was his role in the innovation? 
Given his enthusiasm for the device and that he was instrumental in setting up the 
Walkman project, there is a case for suggesting his role was that of product champion. 
However this fails to recognise that as the chairman of Sony, he was not directly 
involved in the development process. Rather accounts of Sony’s innovations describe 
Morita as ‘the father of the Walkman’ (du Gay et al., 1997: p42), suggesting that his 
role was that of ‘godfather’. 
 
5. THE  MINI 
The Mini was the most successful car to be built in Britain. Over 5 million were built 
over a 41 year period (Wood, 2005: p171). During this time the design remained 
virtually unchanged. Yet when it was launched in 1959 it was ‘revolutionary in 
concept’ for a British car and ‘bristled with ingenuity and innovation’ (Wood, 2005: 
p167). The innovative nature of the Mini has been widely recognised (Whisler, 1999). 
Among the innovative features were: 
• transverse engine and powertrain 
• front wheel drive 
• four wheel independent suspension 
• new standards of manoeuvrability and road holding 
Other cars had included some of these features, but none had included all of them and 
none had combined them in a car with an overall length of barely three metres.  
 
Probably the most significant innovation was the product architecture that combined 
all these features together. This was to be the most influential part of the design, 
something that has been widely copied and is now reflected in the shape and structure 
of most volume built cars on the road today. The Mini was designed and built by what 
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was then the British Motor Corporation (BMC). Its origins are to be found in the 1956 
fuel crisis which led to petrol rationing in Britain. The introduction of petrol rationing 
brought a sharp drop in the demand for cars and increased the popularity of what were 
then known as ‘bubble cars’. These were small, foreign built cars, usually powered by 
a motorcycle engine, that were lightweight and economical to operate. 
 
Incensed by this market trend, late in 1956 Leonard Lord, the chairman and managing 
director of BMC, summoned car designer Alec Issigonis to his office. According to 
one recent biography (Bardsley, 2005: p188) Issigonis was told by Lord to abandon 
the medium sized car he was working on and ‘design  a proper small car to knock all 
those bloody bubble cars off the road’. Lord placed only one restriction on Issigonis. 
Because he wanted the new car to go into production ‘really soon’ (Pomeroy, 1964: 
p29), it had to use an engine that was already in production (Bardsley, 2005; Wood, 
2005). 
 
It was highly significant that the new project was commissioned personally by 
Leonard Lord. Lord had taken over the chairmanship of the British Motor Corporation 
(BMC) from Lord Nuffield two years earlier. A brilliant production engineer (Turner, 
1979), he distrusted anything approaching sophistication in business, having no time 
for either salesmen or accountants (Wyatt, 1980). As head of Britain’s largest car 
manufacturer, he was a powerful force within BMC. Key decisions covering capital 
expenditure, product strategy, product pricing and production plans were the 
responsibility of a Central Committee at BMC but Lord, ‘frequently decided matters 
of pricing and product strategy without reference to the committee’ (Whisler, 1999: 
p47). 
 
The fact that Issigonis had the full backing of Leonard Lord proved vital (Nahum, 
2004). At the time the British car industry in general, and BMC in particular, was 
noted for producing very conventional designs. But Lord’s backing allowed Issigonis 
to put forward a design that was radically different. In particular Issigonis was able to 
incorporate a number of innovations , such as front wheel drive and a transverse 
powertrain, that were particularly effective in addressing the problem of creating a 
small car that could seat four adults in comfort. 
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In practical terms Lord’s backing also affected Issigonis’ s access to facilities. 
Bardsley (2005: p200) notes that,  
 
‘the key to delivering the project in three years was the priority access which 
the Issigonis cell [team] was granted to every single facility that Longbridge 
had to offer.’ 
 
At Lord’s behest, Issigonis’s team was allowed to go anywhere in the Longbridge 
plant and demand immediate attention. Nahum (2004: p55) notes that the team was 
given a priority number for parts manufacture. This meant that,  
 
‘…everything stopped when they saw that number on a drawing. The machine 
shop would make a part overnight, from a freehold sketch, if it was 
dimensioned.’ 
 
These practical examples show how Leonard Lord’s influence supported the project 
team, granting them the highest priority when it came to accessing the company’s 
resources. Without this the project would have been side-lined by the demands of 
routine manufacturing.  
 
Development of the revolutionary new design was rapid. Within 120 days there were 
mock-ups of the new car (Pomeroy, 1964: p58).  By October 1957 two prototypes 
were on the road as the first stage in an extensive test programme. In July 1958 little 
more than 18 months after the project had started, Lord himself drove the new car for 
the first time. After a five minute drive around the Longbridge site, he turned to 
Issigonis and said (Pomeroy, 1964: p51; Nahum, 2004: p57), 
 
 ‘Alec, this is it, I want it in production within twelve months.’ 
 
When Issigonis protested about the work that remained to be done, Lord replied 
(Pomeroy, 1964: p51),  
 
‘Don’t worry about that; I shall sign the cheques, you get on with getting the 
thing to work.’ 
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 At Lord’s direction a new plant was built in Llanelli, to produce body panels for the 
new car, and there was a massive investment in new production facilities at 
Longbridge (Bardsley, 2005). The first production model came off the assembly line 
in April 1959 (Pomeroy, 1964: p65) and was introduced to the press in mid-August.  
A week later on 26th August 1959 the car received its public launch. This was less 
than three years since the start of the project, a record time in which to develop a new 
car, especially one so different from the cars then in use. The planned level of 
production was a very ambitious 3000 cars per week. 
 
Despite a high level of interest in the new car, sales initially faltered. Part of the 
problem was that early models encountered technical problems, one of the most 
publicised being a tendency for the car to fill with water when driven in wet 
conditions. These problems highlighted a negative aspect of a project that enjoyed 
Leonard Lord’s patronage, namely that Issigonis and his small development team did 
not feel it necessary to fully evaluate all aspects of the design. 
 
While sales of the Mini may have, ‘quivered on the brink of failure in its first year of 
life’ (Nahum, 2004: p59), as the new decade began, the new car caught on rapidly 
with more affluent and fashion conscious consumers. The Mini benefited from a host 
of celebrity owners. Sales rose sharply and the car quickly became a best seller. 
Production peaked in the mid-1970s when more than 300,000 per year were built 
(Golding, 1990: p220) and it remained in production until 2000. Such was its 
influence that over time almost every European and Japanese car manufacturer 
developed a small car employing the same innovative product architecture of front 
wheel drive and transverse powertrain. 
 
 
6. CLEARBLUE  
In the postwar years Unilever, aware that its principal products, detergents, soap and 
margarine, were all in mature markets, began to diversify. The diversification was 
based on a combination of innovation and acquisitions (Cox, Mowatt and Prevezer, 
2003). The development of frozen food was an instance of the former, the company’s 
expansion of its ice cream interests an instance of the latter.  
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 In pursuit of innovation Unilever also expanded its research function from the 1950s 
onwards. This reflected, ‘a climate in which there were high expectations that 
research would lead to innovation and so provide a source of growth and new 
business’ (Jones and Kraft, 2004: p106).  Unilever’s research effort tended to be 
incremental and lie within the company’s core markets. As  Jones and Kraft 
(2004:p107) note, ‘Radical innovations remained unlikely not least because operating 
companies were usually not interested in developing and marketing concepts far 
beyond their existing product lines.’ Unilever had a strong record of research, but it 
was a marketing-led company, where marketing and research were divorced from one 
another. The situation was not helped by Unilever’s corporate culture which 
emphasized consensus rather risk taking.  
 
Against this background, Unilever’s success during the 1980s in developing a new 
medical diagnostic business stands in sharp contrast. The Clearblue pregnancy testing 
kit was a ‘flagship product’ (Jones and Kraft, 2004: p110) that enabled Unilever to 
enter an entirely new field, the ‘over the counter’ (OTC ) healthcare market using the 
fruits of its own research.  
 
The origins of Clearblue went back to the immunological research undertaken at 
Unilever’s Colworth laboratory in Bedfordshire, for the company’s animal feeds 
division in the 1970s. Although this work led to a number of successful antibody 
products for livestock, the company failed to build on it. The Colworth laboratory was 
also active in helping its new medical division launch a number of diagnostic kits for 
use in hospitals and doctors’ surgeries to identify bacterial infections. This led to a 
number of important patents being filed in the monoclonal antibodies (MCA) field. 
Despite the company’s lead in immunology research, changes in company strategy in 
the early 1980s, meant that further innovations in this field looked unlikely.  
 
However the company’s Chemical Coordinator, T. Thomas, who was a member of 
Unilever’s main board (Jones, 2005), recognised the potential of the company’s 
science base. Following a visit to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) he 
became convinced that Unilever should enter the medical diagnostics field. So it was 
that in 1982, Thomas with the strong support of Unilever’s research director, Sir 
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Geoffrey Allen, was able to convince the company to establish a new Medical 
Products Group (MPG) (Jones, 2005: p293).  Allen and Thomas also persuaded the 
company’s Special Committee to grant the MPG funds from Unilever’s central 
resources in order to continue research, acknowledging that there would be losses as 
the unit built up its knowledge (Jones, 2005). The following year the MPG re-
launched the medical diagnostics business as a separate company called Unipath.  
Unipath not only enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, it also enjoyed support at the 
highest levels within the company. Wary of entering the pharmaceutical field, 
Unilever’s research director, strongly supported Unipath’s focus on the growing over-
the-counter (OTC) diagnostics market. It provided excellent scope for applying 
MPG’s biotechnology expertise to diagnostic products for pregnancy testing, fertility 
status, and cholesterol and infectious disease status. 
 
Strategy centred on achieving a significant innovation in a short space of time in order 
to ensure that MPG was not perceived internally as an expensive ‘research boutique’ 
(Jones and Kraft, 2004: p113). An OTC pregnancy test kit, derived from Unilever’s 
research into monoclonal antibodies and ready-to-use immunological reagents,  
quickly emerged as a potential ‘flagship product’ for Unipath.  The Clearblue 
pregnancy test kit developed by Unipath, less than two years after MPG had been 
established, represented a significant advance on anything then on the market. 
Clearblue was more sensitive, faster and more reliable than any competing product. 
Particular attention was directed towards consumer feedback which identified 
problems in using existing products. The findings from consumer feedback were 
incorporated into the design process to yield not only a very effective but also a 
thoroughly user-friendly product. Unipath’s structure as a relatively small but 
independent unit made it possible to maintain close links between research and 
marketing. The science-led, but innovation-driven culture of Unipath facilitated the 
flow of information across the research/marketing interface.  The strength of internal 
links permitted a rapid process of innovation. In this environment and given the 
relatively youthful nature of the enterprise, innovation was seen as a priority. In 
addition Unipath also benefited from having a culture that was both team oriented and 
outward looking, maintaining strong links with the external scientific community.  
This contrasted with the more cautious, consensus-building culture that was typical 
elsewhere in Unilever.  
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 Clearblue was launched in 1985 and was an immediate success. Within three months 
it had become the market leader in Britain with a one third share of the market. By 
1988 Clearblue was generating an annual profit of £8m. Further innovations followed. 
In the same year Clearblue One Stop was launched featuring a simplified and easier to 
use process. Other OTC diagnostic testing kits were developed including Clearplan 
launched in 1989, which tested for the onset of ovulation, and in the mid-1990s 
Clearview which tested for Chlamydia and Persona a fertility monitoring kit.  
 
7. CROSS CASE ANALYSIS 
All three of the cases cited are instances of radical innovation. The Walkman 
transformed the audio equipment market creating an entirely new type of product, the 
portable stereo tape player. The Mini not only created a new class of compact small 
car it created a new product architecture comprising front wheel drive and a 
transverse powertrain. That it has been copied by most other car manufacturers, is an 
indication of the significance of the design. Clearblue was not the first OTC 
pregnancy kit, but it was a significant advance on anything then on the market and set 
the standard as a user-friendly product. In addition it was a radical innovation for 
Unilever, being the company’s first OTC medical diagnostic product. Hence in all 
three cases the innovation in question was a significant one that transformed the 
business. 
 
What is clear in all three of the cases is that the success of the innovation was closely 
linked to the actions of a senior executive. On the basis of the case studies the senior 
executives provided various forms of assistance, namely: 
 
• Vision 
• Credibility 
• Protection 
• Access to resources 
 
Vision implies having the foresight to see the potential of a new product, service or 
process, in terms of as yet untapped markets and unknown consumers. Thus Akio 
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Morita, from his knowledge of young people, or simply commercial intuition, could 
envisage a market for a new type of music player. Closely allied to this was the 
extraordinary faith that Morita had in his vision. This was critically important 
because, as the case indicates, this was something that Sony’s engineers, accountants 
and marketing personnel did not share. Similarly Unilever benefited from T. 
Thomas’s vision of the potential of medical diagnostics for the company, something 
inspired by his visits to MIT, and it was Leonard Lord’s vision of a British small car 
to beat the so-called ‘bubble cars’ of the 1950s, that led to the Mini project. 
 
The senior executives in these case studies also provided the respective projects with 
credibility. Given that all the innovations involved radical departures from existing 
products/technologies, they posed a challenge to internal vested interests. To counter 
the threat posed by these vested interests, all three innovations badly needed 
credibility. With powerful backers within their organisations, they gained credibility. 
That credibility was directly attributable to the support of senior executives. At 
Unilever Sir Geoffrey Allen, knighted for his contribution to science, was a respected 
scientist with an international reputation. At Sony, Akio Morita was virtually unique, 
not only was he the company chairman, and thus accorded much respect within the 
company hierarchy, he was also one of the company’s co-founders. In addition he was 
no mean innovator himself having played a big part in the introduction of the 
transistor radio and the tape recorder. In the case of the Mini, Leonard Lord’s 
credibility, certainly within the British car industry was undisputed in the 1950s when 
the car was being developed. Described as the most powerful man in the industry 
(Wood, 2005), when combined with his personal qualities which the same study 
described as, ‘decisive, combative, ruthless and dictatorial’ (Wood, 2005: p171), this 
meant that Leonard Lord was inclined to treat BMC as, ‘his personal fiefdom’ (Wood, 
2005: p47). Consequently Issigonis and his small development team were in 
Bardsley’s (2005: p176) words, 
 
 ‘like an independent enclave operating in the grand principality of Longbridge 
 under the protection of its overlord, Chairman Leonard Lord.’ 
 
The support provided by these senior executives is strongly linked to the protection it 
afforded the innovation and those developing it. In all three instances the project faced 
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a potentially hostile culture within the parent organisation. In the case of the Mini, the 
culture within the British car industry was extremely conservative (Wood, 2005). 
British designs were not innovative. This was true of BMC and the Longbridge plant 
where the Mini was developed. According to Sharratt (2000: p179) in his history of 
the Longbridge plant, the Mini  
 
 ‘... couldn’t have come from the existing team at Longbridge. Not in a hundred 
 years.’ 
 
It was a similar story at Unilever. According to Jones and Kraft (2005: p107) Unilever 
had, ‘a culture of caution’. This meant that innovation tended to be incremental and 
located within the company’s core markets. This was a culture in which developments 
in new fields like medical diagnostics were not likely to be well received. Even 
Sony’s culture, which was normally very receptive to innovation, was not ready for 
the Walkman. The problem is well illustrated by the language associated with the 
Walkman. Regarded as ‘heresy’ by Sony’s engineers (Nayak and Ketteringham, 1993: 
p100) and described as a ‘dumb product’ by Sony’s salesmen (Nayak and 
Ketteringham, 1993: p101), the Walkman was developed in a culture that was neither 
welcoming nor supportive. Under the circumstances the support of a senior executive 
was essential. Morita, Lord and Allen, were able to afford the respective innovations 
protection from a hostile culture. As the Walkman case illustrates, staff were willing 
to go along with the new development even though they doubted its value, because of 
respect for Akio Morita. It was a similar story in the other companies. 
 
The three cases also point to the senior executives involved providing access to 
resources. Leonard Lord’s ability to provide access to scarce resources was probably 
the most spectacular. He provided Issigonis and his small team with priority access to 
all the facilities that a large integrated car plant like Longbridge could offer. As 
Bardsley (2005: p200) notes, 
 
 ‘The key to delivering the product within three years was the priority access 
 which the Issigonis cell [team] was granted to every single facility that 
 Longbridge had to offer.’ 
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and again (Bardsley, 2005: p205), 
 
 ‘The support given by Leonard Lord was absolutely vital. He was the only 
 person who could mobilize the factory 100 per cent behind the project which 
 meant not just opening the doors of the experimental department but also 
 allocating vast amounts of money to build the necessary facilities for 
 manufacture.’ 
 
At Unilever, Sir Geoffrey Allen and T. Thomas secured additional financial resources 
for Unipath, in the form of a special allocation of funds from Unilever’s central 
resources. At Sony, the resources provided by Akio Morita were less obvious. Given 
the very short development timescale, a lot of components were effectively 
cannibalised from existing products. However there was one important resource to 
which Akio Morita did provide access, namely headphone technology. This was vital 
in ensuring that the Walkman was a truly portable stereo tape player. 
 
The case studies tell a consistent story in terms of the support provided for 
innovations by senior executives. Analysis of the cases also reveals another common 
theme. The cases show senior executives exercising power and influence indirectly. 
Morita at Sony, Lord at BMC, and Allen and Thomas at Unilever, all relied on 
‘behind-the-scenes’ approaches to aid their respective innovations,  rather than 
participating directly as a member of the development team. Hence a further attribute 
of this role, and one that differentiates it from other roles associated with innovation, 
is that it tends to be carried out in a discreet, even covert manner. 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
All three of the cases that form the basis of this study centre on radical innovations 
undertaken by large organisations. This is the kind of context in which one might 
expect innovation to have a political dimension. Innovation in any organisation tends 
to be accompanied by change. Where the innovation is radical rather than 
incremental, then the change is likely to be all the more significant as new 
technologies, new knowledge and new ways of working are introduced. These were 
exactly the types of change found in these three cases. Consequently they all involve 
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situations where the political dynamics meant the project needed the kind of support 
that only a very senior figure within the organisation could provide.  
 
Detailed analysis of the cases yields extensive evidence about the precise nature of the 
support provided. It is shown that the support took the form of vision, credibility, 
protection and access to resources. This kind of support was possible because of the 
individuals concerned. They were not merely senior executives. All three were major 
figures within their respective industries. They were highly respected, one might even 
say they were revered within their organisations. This enabled them to provide 
support without the need for direct involvement in the project. Instead they were able 
to rely on subtle, behind-the-scenes methods and this aspect is one of the defining 
aspects of the role.  
 
The distinctive nature of the role and the subtleties surrounding the way in which it is 
carried out, makes it difficult to describe. In such situations metaphors can be helpful. 
The value of metaphors lies in their ability to transfer knowledge from a familiar 
domain to an unfamiliar one (Tsoukas, 1991). Widely used in both the physical 
sciences (Kaplan, 1964) and the social sciences (Hunt and Menon, 1995), they 
provide powerful insights that aid explanation and facilitate understanding. Where the 
roles associated with innovation are concerned, we have already seen that metaphors 
such as champion, gatekeeper and sponsor are used as explanatory devices to indicate 
the nature of each role. In this instance the metaphor of godfather appears to be the 
most appropriate.  
 
The metaphor owes more to the American Mafia than the Christian tradition. Both 
imply some one who provides some form of protection. In the Christian tradition the 
godfather role involves spiritual guidance and protection for children. In the American 
Mafia it is physical protection derived from the reverence and respect accorded the 
godfather figure by the criminal community. However it is not just a matter of 
protection. Mafia godfathers, at least as portrayed in the media, are noted for using 
behind-the-scenes methods to achieve their ends.   
 
There are a number of potential metaphors that could be used to describe the role. It 
has already been shown that the metaphor of sponsor covers some aspects, especially 
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the provision of support in the form of financial assistance. Similarly one could use 
the metaphor of patron. A patron is a benefactor. Found especially in the arts, a patron 
is typically a wealthy individual who encourages and supports young artists. Neither 
of these metaphors however, expresses the way this role is carried out. Sponsors 
typically want to make much of their involvement, while the support of a patron, 
would normally be overt and probably widely publicised. The evidence of the case 
studies clearly shows senior executives not being directly involved in the innovation, 
but rather working behind-the-scenes in order to ‘pull the various strings’ (Tidd et al., 
2005: p482), and ensure it succeeds. This dimension, combined with the protective 
aspect of the role and the respect and authority commanded by those who exercise it, 
suggests neither the sponsor nor the patron metaphors adequately conveys the nature 
of the role. It is precisely the covert, protective aspects of the role that the godfather 
metaphor confers.  
 
Inevitably metaphors have their limitations. Firstly, metaphors by their nature are 
imprecise (Tsoukas, 1991). They rely for their power on their falseness and this 
inevitably means they do not exactly define the object in question. However the 
purpose of the paper is not to test or evaluate the role, but to identify and explore it 
and precision is therefore not critical. What is needed is something that is evocative, 
conveying the essential differentiating features of the role, which the godfather 
metaphor does very effectively. A second limitation is that individual metaphors tend 
to have a short life (Hunt and Menon, 1995). When first used a specific metaphor may 
indeed be fresh and incisive, but it loses its impact if used repeatedly. While the 
godfather metaphor has been used before in different contexts, it remains a powerful 
metaphor. It is not commonly used in management nor is it normally associated with 
innovation and technology, and it therefore retains its vitality and freshness. A third 
limitation is that metaphors are subject to what Black (1993: p20) refers to as 
metaphoric ‘inflation’, where metaphors in general are used so frequently that they 
loose their power. This may be true of some fields of management (Tsoukas, 1991) 
such as marketing. In the literature on innovation however, metaphors have been used 
more sparingly. True, metaphors have been used in connection with other roles 
associated with innovation, but if anything this provides a rationale for using a 
metaphor in this instance rather a deterrent. Their use in a similar context 
demonstrates their value in conveying the salient features of a role. 
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 Hence the case for using metaphors in general and the godfather metaphor in 
particular is strong. The evidence of the case studies points to a role in which 
powerful individuals all of whom are highly respected figures, use their influence to 
subtly guide innovation projects through the organisational hurdles that stand in their 
way. To describe this as a godfather role seems much the most appropriate metaphor. 
What is needed now is to flesh out more of the contexts in which the godfather role is 
significant. The paper shows that the role is a feature of radical innovations in large 
organisations, only further research will show whether it is more generally applicable. 
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